Breaking

Third-party script supply chain: 178 organizations confirmed affected — cleanup alone did not evict the attacker.

The Hacker News
Supply Chain Web Security 6 min read

Hackers hijacked Optimizely scripts to serve malicious code to CNN, BBC and Zoom visitors

At least 178 organizations were affected by a script injection campaign that skimmed card data, swapped cryptocurrency addresses at checkout, and tried to fire iOS exploits at mobile visitors.

THN
The Hacker News
@TheHackersNews
𝕏

‼️ BREAKING — Hackers hijacked Optimizely scripts to serve malicious code to visitors of CNN, BBC, Zoom and other major sites.

At least 178 organizations affected. The payload targeted card data, swapped crypto addresses and attempted iOS exploits.

7:14 AM · Nov 17, 2026 19.4K Views 21 · 61 · 181 · 58
178Organizations
3Loader variants
iOSExploit attempt
LiveRe-infection

Attackers are abusing Optimizely, the widely deployed experimentation and feature-flagging platform, to inject malicious JavaScript into customer sites. Because the tag is loaded from a trusted third-party origin and normally ships on every page view, the injected code inherits the full trust of the host site and runs before most defences can see it.

The campaign has now been confirmed on at least 178 organizations, including major media and SaaS properties. Investigators say the rogue snippet behaves differently depending on where it lands: on commerce pages it hooks form handlers to lift card data, on crypto-facing pages it rewrites destination addresses held in the clipboard and in DOM attributes, and on mobile traffic it appends a second stage aimed at iOS builds.

The iOS stage does not need a malicious app. It just needs a browser and a version range the payload recognises.

Three loader variants, one goal

Three distinct loader shapes have been recovered so far. Each is built to survive a different mitigation:

  • Inline variant — the full payload is carried in the loader itself, so blocking the attacker domain does not stop it.
  • Remote variant — a short stub fetches the real payload from an attacker-controlled host, letting operators swap behaviour per visitor.
  • Delayed variant — waits for DOM readiness and user interaction before attaching, which defeats scanners that only parse the initial HTML.

Analysts note that blocking the attacker's domain, a common first reflex, does not stop every payload. The inline variant keeps working with the domain blackholed.

Cleanup alone was not enough

At Smartsheet, removing the malicious code from the Optimizely snippet did not keep the operator out. The snippet was re-infected with a hidden version of the same code shortly after cleanup, which points to the attacker still holding write access to the Optimizely project at that moment — not to a second, unrelated compromise.

That distinction matters for anyone doing incident response. Rotating the Optimizely project credentials and auditing every member, token and integration with write scope has to happen before the snippet is considered clean, otherwise the fix is reverted inside a day.

What site owners should inspect

The injected code is small and deliberately quiet. Review the following in each Optimizely snippet and in the rendered page:

  • Any createElement("script") or dynamic import that was not part of the original project.
  • Base64 blobs, eval-style decoding, or hex string concatenation ahead of a src assignment.
  • Form submit listeners that read card fields, plus clipboard write calls on checkout and wallet pages.
  • Mobile-only branches keyed on user agent that load a second file.

Deployments that use Subresource Integrity on the Optimizely tag are not automatically safe: the tag itself is the trusted origin, so an SRI hash pinned to a moving third-party bundle usually only protects the first hop.

Advisory

Rotate Optimizely credentials and API tokens, audit project membership for accounts that should no longer have write access, and re-check the snippet from a second network and user agent after cleanup. Where possible, diff the current snippet against a known-good copy taken before the incident instead of reading it fresh — the hidden third variant is authored to look ordinary.

Status: active. Confirmed impact spans media, SaaS and commerce properties. Organizations that embed third-party experimentation or tag-manager scripts should assume exposure until their snippet has been diffed and their project access reviewed.

Live updates — this page refreshes
  • 07:41Re-infection confirmed at a second victim — defenders who only rotated credentials saw the payload return within 36 hours.
  • 07:22Mobile Safari visits singled out: the delayed variant waits for a human scroll before the iOS stage arms.
  • 06:58Two CDN edge nodes caught serving clean HTML to desktops and the injected variant to phones — per-visitor targeting confirmed.
  • 06:31Clipboard swaps escalate: hot wallets are now explicitly matched by address-shape heuristics before overwrite.
  • 05:47Hunting guide published below — site owners can sweep their snippets in under five minutes.

Check your exposure in 60 seconds

Run this personal audit —tick items off as you go. Nothing leaves your device.

Safety score: start ticking…

More from our coverage

Malware

Clipboard hijackers moved 2,400 ETH in October — here is how they pick victims

Address-shape matching means cold-storage users are collateral. What behavioural telemetry shows.

Mobile

Safari's silent reload: why injected service workers survive a simple tab swipe

WKWebView persistence quirks keep payload stages warm — the restart advice, explained.

Incident response

The 36-hour re-infection window nobody budgets for

Rotation alone fails when member-access hygiene is skipped. A practicable playbook.

Editor's log: updated 07:41 UTC with re-infection confirmation; 06:58 added per-visitor targeting detail; 05:47 hunting guide attached. Correction 05:12 — Smartsheet statement paraphrased with permission.

reading 0%